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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Zachary Polk Nelson appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine. A jury found Mr. Nelson guilty, and the district court imposed a unified
sentence of ten years, with three years determinate. Mr. Nelson appeals, and he asserts that the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 28, 2018, Officer Brandon Esparza from the Meridian Police Department
responded to a call at the Courtyard Marriott. (Tr., p.7, 1-5.) 1 He explained,
The calling party was hotel management and staff calling about a room there at
the Marriott. They had complaints from the guests. The complaints were - it was
Room 148. They were complaining that there were sexual noises coming from
the room and drug activity coming from the room, and they had stated that there
was a female in the room along with up to five males in the room.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.16-23.) The call also explained "potential vehicles that were associated with the
room," which were a Ford Explorer and a grey Chevrolet truck with Canyon County license
plates. (Tr., p.8, Ls.1-5.) The only name Officer Esparza received was the name of the person
who rented room 148, but he did not identify this person at the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.8,
Ls.6-13.) This was the only information Officer Esparza had received when he arrived at the
Marriott.
Officer Esparza acknowledged that the sex noises from the room did not indicate that a
crime was being committed. (Tr., p.19, Ls.8-11.) With regard to the report of "drug activity,"
Officer Esparza acknowledged that no specific information was provided regarding what drug
1

Unless otherwise noted, citations to the transcript are to the transcript of the April 1, 2019
motion to suppress hearing, which begins on page 114 of the electronic file containing the
transcripts on appeal.

1

activity that might have been. (Tr., p.18, Ls.23-25.) He did not know "whether somebody had a
marijuana bong in the hotel or whether it was a bag of drugs." (Tr., p.19, Ls.4-7.) In fact, no
testimony was provided as to what the hotel management, through anonymous reporting guests,
saw, heard, or smelled regarding "drug activity." (See generally Tr.)
Officer Esparza drove into the parking lot, located the Chevrolet truck, and parked right
behind the vehicle that was parked next to the truck. (Tr., p.9, L.1 - p.10, L.10.) He saw two
individuals leave the hotel and approach the Chevrolet truck. (Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.2.)
Officer Esparza approached them, shook Mr. Nelson's hand, and asked him where he was
coming from; Mr. Nelson stated "the hotel."

(Exhibit 8 at 0:34-40.)2

Mr. Nelson then

approached the driver's side door of the Chevrolet and Officer Esparza told them not to go
anywhere and then asked if they had identification.
"displayed no aggression whatsoever."

(Exhibit 8 at 0:41-47.)

(Tr., p.15, Ls.12-16.)

Mr. Nelson

Officer Esparza then asked

Mr. Nelson to put down a Crown Royal bag that he was holding, "because I didn't know what
was inside," and Mr. Nelson placed it on the back of the truck on a cooler. (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-16.)
Officer Esparza acknowledged that Mr. Nelson was detained at the point he was told not
to get into the truck. (Tr., p.16, Ls.21-25.) While Mr. Nelson was detained, a drug dog came to
the scene and alerted on the vehicle; inside the Crown Royal bag, officers found a small scale,
plastic baggies, and a large white crystal substance that subsequently tested positive for
methamphetamine. (Preliminary Hearing Tr., p.9, L.21-p.10, L..2)
Mr. Nelson was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine and frequenting a place
where controlled substances are known to be located. (R., p.21.) He filed a motion to suppress
the evidence seized from him as a result of his unlawful detention. (R., p.26.) Specifically, he
2

The video of Officer Esparza's contact with Mr. Nelson was admitted at the suppression
hearing and at trial and is contained in the record as Exhibit 8.
2

asserted that Officer Esparza lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain him in the
Marriott parking lot. (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress. ) 3 The district court
denied the motion, holding:
There was a brief, investigative detention of the defendant. No weapons were ever
drawn. No voices were ever raised. No sirens or police lights were activated.
Information gained as soon as Officer Esparza arrived allowed him to determine
that he was talking to the men associated with the call about drug activity
occurring out of Room 148. Officer Esparza never drew his weapon and never
engaged in any kind of threatening behavior. Although the other officers showed
up as the encounter continued, they did not display any weapons and did not even
approach the defendant. Although Officer Esparza' s vehicle was parked several
feet behind another vehicle and was near the defendant's truck, it did not block
the ability to exit although it would have been a little more difficult to pull out.
The entire Terry 4 stop lasted six minutes before it moved from a Terry stop to a
probable cause arrest. This was a very brief investigative detention. Nothing was
abnormally drawn out. No voices were raised nor were any weapons drawn. It
was the kind of brief, investigative detention contemplated by Terry.
(R., p.36-37.)
Mr. Nelson proceeded to trial, where he was found guilty of trafficking in
methamphetamine but found not guilty of frequenting.

(R., pp.56-57.)

The district court

imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years determinate. (R., p.63.) Mr. Nelson
appealed. (R., p.67.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

3

A motion to augment the record with Mr. Nelson's brief in support of the motion is being filed
contemporaneously with this Appellant's Brief.
4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nelson's motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nelson's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Nelson submits that Officer Esparza seized him without reasonable suspicion and

therefore the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact which were
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127
Idaho 102, 106 (1995).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nelson's Motion To Suppress
Limited investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable

articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013). "Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those
facts." Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion requires more than a
mere hunch or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the

circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Id.

5

While the district court did not specifically articulate the point at which Mr. Nelson was
seized, Officer Esparza testified that Mr. Nelson was seized when he was told not to get in the
truck. (Tr., p.16, Ls.21-25.) Mr. Nelson agrees. At this point, Officer Esparza knew:
The calling party was hotel management and staff calling about a room there at
the Marriott. They had complaints from the guests. The complaints were - it was
Room 148. They were complaining that there were sexual noises coming from
the room and drug activity coming from the room, and they had stated that there
was a female in the room along with up to five males in the room.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.16-23.) The call also explained "potential vehicles that were associated with the
room," which were a Ford Explorer and a grey Chevrolet truck with Canyon County license
plates. (Tr., p.8, Ls.1-5.) The only name Officer Esparza received was the name of the person
who rented room 148, but he did not identify this person at the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.8,
Ls.6-13.) He then saw Mr. Nelson, carrying a Crown Royal bag, and another individual walk
toward the truck, and Mr. Nelson stated he was coming from the hotel. Mr. Nelson submits that
this information does not satisfy the Terry standard for seizing an individual.
First, the complaint about "sexual noises" coming from the room does not contribute to
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed.
acknowledged that the noises did not indicate any potential crime.

Officer Esparza

(Tr., p.19, Ls.8-11.)

Mr. Nelson agrees.
Thus, Officer Esparza was left with only the conclusory allegation that "drug activity"
was being committed in the room. As Officer Esparza acknowledged at the suppression hearing,
he had no specific information as to what drug activity might have been occurring. (Tr., p.18,
Ls.23-25.) He had no information as to what any of the reporting guests heard, smelled, or saw.
(See generally, Tr.)

In other words, he had no "specific, articulable facts" regarding any

potential crime in the hotel room. See Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (citation omitted).

6

The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the reliability of a tip in State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho
804 (2008). There, the Court noted that an informant's tip regarding suspected criminal activity
can give rise to reasonable suspicion when it would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that a stop was appropriate." Id. at 811 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329
(1990)).

Whether a tip provides reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the

circumstances including the substance, source, and reliability of the information provided. Id.
Factors indicative of reliability include whether the informant reveals his or her
identity and the basis of his or her knowledge, whether the location of the
informant is known, whether the information was based on first-hand
observations of events as they were occurring, whether the information the
informant provided was subject to immediate confirmation or corroboration by
police, whether the informant has previously provided reliable information,
whether the informant provides predictive information, and whether the informant
could be held criminally liable if the report were discovered to be false.
Id. at 812. "If a tip lacks adequate indicia of reliability, police generally must engage in further

investigation before conducting a Terry stop." Id.
If a tip is anonymous and merely provides a description of a suspect and alleges that he or

she committed crime, that tip will generally not give rise to reasonable suspicion. Id. (citing
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000)).

Tips received from citizen-informants are generally

presumed reliable because the informant's reputation can be assessed and, if the informant is
untruthful, he or she may be subject to criminal liability for filing a false report. Id. "Still, under
the totality of the circumstances analysis, the content of the tip and the informant's basis of
knowledge remain relevant in determining whether the tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion." Id.
In Bishop, the police received a tip from the City Superintendent, Mr. Kelley, who
reported that two carnival workers approached him and indicated that a man, later identified as
Mr. Bishop, had attempted to sell them methamphetamine. Id. at 809. Mr. Kelley told the
officer that the carnival workers asked him to report the incident and they relayed a description

7

of Mr. Bishop to him. Id. After reporting the incident, Mr. Kelley located Mr. Bishop and
followed him to a local market; he then called the officer again to report Mr. Bishop's location.
Id. The officer then attempted to stop and frisk Mr. Bishop, who resisted. Id. However, he was

eventually arrested. Id.
On appeal, Mr. Bishop asserted that the stop was unlawful because the information
received from Mr. Kelly was not reliable. Id. at 810. Specifically, he asserted that the tip was
anonymous because Mr. Kelly just was relaying information from unnamed carnival workers.
Id. at 813.

The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this argument because the officer knew

Mr. Kelley's identify, and Mr. Kelley subjected himself to criminal liability for potentially
making a false report. Id. Further, the Court noted that Mr. Kelley had provided police with
sufficient information to trace the workers' identities.

Id.

Thus, the Court held that both

Mr. Kelley and the workers were citizen-informants and went on to address the content of the tip
and the informants' basis of knowledge. Id. The Court concluded:
Superintendent Kelley's tip that Bishop had attempted to sell methamphetamine
to two carnival workers provided Miller with reasonable suspicion to stop Bishop.
The tip possessed adequate indicia of reliability as evidenced by its source and
content. Kelley was a known citizen-informant whose reliability could be
presumed. Kelley informed Miller that Bishop had attempted to sell two carnival
workers methamphetamine, provided a detailed description of Bishop, and was
able to relay Bishop's precise location. Further, Kelley informed Chief Miller that
his report was based on information he received directly from the two carnival
workers, who had personally observed Bishop's attempt to sell them
methamphetamine.
Id. at 815. Further, regarding the workers, the Court held:

The carnival workers' report to Kelley also possessed adequate indicia of
reliability. The report was based on an alleged crime that the workers personally
observed. The workers were able to provide a specific description of Bishop,
which allowed Kelley to locate Bishop and provide Miller with a running report
of Bishop's location. There is no evidence that the workers were trying to conceal
their identities or were providing false information. Instead, the workers' decision
to report the incident directly to a city official suggests that the opposite is true.

8

Moreover, Kelley put enough trust in the workers' allegations to report it to the
police. The fact that Kelley considered the report reliable is also evidenced by the
fact that he decided to follow Bishop until Miller arrived.
Id. This case is very different than Bishop.

Here, though the call came from the hotel, there is no information in this record regarding
the guests who made the report. There is no evidence that the guests identified themselves to the
hotel management or staff, no description of the guests was given to Officer Esparza, and there is
no indication that the hotel management or staff did any investigation of their own to corroborate
any aspect of the tip.

This is a far cry from a City Superintendent identifying himself and

providing sufficient information to identify unnamed workers. Thus, Mr. Nelson submits that
this Court should treat this as an anonymous tip that simply makes a criminal accusation and
therefore unreliable. See J.L., 529 U.S. 266.
However, even if this Court considers the tip to be from a citizen-informant, the content
of the tip and the informants' basis of knowledge do not provide reasonable suspicion. The tip in
this case is simply an allegation of "drug activity" occurring a hotel room, without any indication
of how the guest/staff was aware of such activity. The State presented no evidence as to what
the hotel management, through the guests saw, heard, or smelled in the hotel room, unlike in
Bishop, where the workers made the specific allegation that Mr. Bishop had approached them

and attempted to sell them methamphetamine. The tip simply offered a conclusory allegation
that a drug crime was taking place in the hotel room without any assertion of fact indicating the
basis of that knowledge. And again, there is nothing to indicate that anyone employed by the
hotel did any kind of follow up investigation, unlike Mr. Kelley in Bishop. Thus, the tip lacks
specific, articulable facts that indicate that illegal activity was happening in the hotel room.

9

This leaves only the fact that Mr. Nelson was carrying a Crown Royal bag as he walked
to his vehicle. While Officer Esparza testified that such a bag could contain contraband or a
weapon, the same is true of nearly every container. (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-10.) Common items that
individuals take to hotel, such as luggage and purses, can contain weapons or contraband. It is
not suspicious behavior to carry a bag out of a hotel room, and it certainly does not corroborate
the tip, as the tip contains no factual assertions to corroborate. Further, it is quite common for
hotel guests to bring alcohol, including Crown Royal, into hotel rooms.
The district court's order in this case places emphasis on the fact that the encounter was
generally polite and cordial - that voices were not raised, weapons were not drawn, and that
sirens were never activated. While Mr. Nelson agrees with this characterization, it is ultimately
irrelevant to the issue raised by the suppression motion.

Mr. Nelson was seized without

reasonable suspicion and Officer Esparza's politeness is irrelevant.
The tip in this case conveyed no assertions of specific, articulable facts, and contained no
facts demonstrating how or why the guests believed that "drug activity" was occurred. The
guests merely had a hunch that "drug activity" was occurred, and, therefore, Officer Esparza had
only this same hunch when he seized Mr. Nelson. Thus the tip, whether considered anonymous
or made by a citizen-informant, failed to provide Officer Esparza with reasonable suspicion to
stop Mr. Nelson. The subsequent search of Mr. Nelson's vehicle is the fruit of the illegal stop of
Mr. Nelson, Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963), and thus the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 20 th day of July, 2020.

/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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